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Abstract  
Whereas Realistic Conflict Theory claims that there is a negative relationship between the share of 
immigrants and the level of support for the extreme-right, Contact Theory claims that the relationship 
is positive. Using the technique of multilevel modelling, I will challenge these mutually exclusive 
theories  by  arguing  that the  relationship  between  immigration and  extreme-right  support  is  more 
complex. Instead of working in opposition to each other, Conflict Theory and Contact Theory operate 
simultaneously but at different levels of aggregation. The focus on immigrants as a contextual factor 
gives  the  impression  that  the  Front  National  is  an  ‘urban  phenomenon’  concentrated  in  high-
immigration suburbs, however recent headlines suggest that the vote is declining in urban strongholds 
and spreading to rural areas. In a second analysis, I will demonstrate that the level of support for the 
Front  National  is  higher  in  rural  communes  than  in  urban  communes.  Drawing  from  Social 
Disintegration Theory, I will argue that the party’s appeal to rural areas is a result of: 1) France’s 
agricultural crisis; 2) the growing divide between rural and urban spaces; and 3) the cut-backs on public 
expenditures. 
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1  Introduction 
Since the 1980s several extreme-right parties in Europe, such as the Front National in France, the 
Republikaners in Germany, and the Freedom Party in Austria, have made extensive electoral gains. 
Seeking to understand why people are voting for these parties, scholars have provided individual and 
contextual explanations. Whereas individual explanations are concerned with the voter’s personal 
interest in a specific issue or their belonging to a socio-economic category, contextual explanations are 
concerned with the voter’s surroundings. In the case of France’s extreme-right party, surveys on issue 
salience and socio-economic background have revealed that despite its xenophobic message and strong 
stance against immigration, the Front National is not a single-issue party (Mudde, 1999). In IPSOS’ 
survey of France’s 2007 presidential elections, voters were asked to pick three themes which influenced 
their choice of candidate. Although immigration scored the highest (64%), it was closely rivalled by 
insecurity (62%) followed by maintaining purchasing power (39%), unemployment (29%) and the 
European Union (23%). Exit poll surveys by IFOP have also revealed that voters come from a variety 
of socio-economic backgrounds: whereas in 1984 the Front National appealed largely to members of 
the bourgeoisie, in 1995 the party also began attracting more manual workers, eventually becoming 
France’s number one workers’ party (Mitra, 1988).  
While individual-level analyses are a useful method for illustrating the diversity of the extreme-
right electorate, they are constrained by the fact that not all explanations for the vote are found at the 
individual level. Because individuals are also influenced by their surroundings, it is possible that some 
environments are more conducive to extreme-right voting than others. For example, an artisan living in 
a heavily industrialised area may be more likely to vote for the extreme-right than an artisan living in a 
rural area because the former faces more competition from big manufacturers. Contextual factors can 
create regional variations in support which in the case of the Front National are significant: in the 1995 
presidential elections, less than 4.6% voted for Le Pen in the department of Corrèze, whereas in Bas-
Rhin  where  the  European  capital  of  Strasbourg  is  located,  26%  favoured  Le  Pen  (Lubbers  and 
Scheepers, 2002). The bulk of support for the party comes from a limited number of departments 
namely,  Nord,  Pas-de-Calais,  Bouches-du-Rhone,  Var,  Vaucluse,  Gard  and  the  departments 
surrounding Paris. Compared to the rest of France, these areas feature high rates of immigration which 
suggests at first glance that contact with immigrants leads people to vote for the extreme-right.  
Given their strong xenophobic message, extreme-right parties are more likely to attract voters 
in areas where there are many immigrants. This is the premise of Realistic Conflict Theory which claims 
that immigrants and natives are in competition for limited resources (Campbell, 1965). Contact Theory 
on the other hand, claims that contact with foreigners actually reduces intergroup tensions therefore 
extreme-right parties are less likely to attract voters in areas where there are many immigrants (Allport, 
1954). Using the Front National as a case study, I will challenge these mutually exclusive theories by 
arguing that the relationship between immigration and extreme-right support is more complex. Instead 
of working in opposition to each other, Conflict Theory and Contact Theory operate simultaneously but 
at different levels of aggregation.  
However, immigration is not the only contextual factor which can help to explain the extreme-
right vote. Jackman and Volpert (1996) found that these parties also benefit from high levels of 
unemployment. Unemployment is tied to immigration through Realistic Conflict Theory: seeing as jobs 
are  one  of  the  limited  resources  natives  and  foreigners  compete  for,  natives  are  likely  to  blame 
foreigners for the scarcity of jobs. The overbearing focus on immigration and unemployment in the 
literature on the Front National suggests that the party is an ‘urban phenomenon’ rooted in cities where IMI Working Papers Series 2013, No. 79    5 
both these factors are intertwined. In a second analysis, I hope to contribute to the literature on 
contextual factors by challenging this image of the Front National as an ‘urban phenomenon’. Drawing 
from Social Disintegration Theory, I will argue that as a result of: 1) France’s agricultural crisis; 2) the 
growing divide between rural and urban spaces; and 3) cut-backs on public expenditures, the party is 
appealing to rural areas. Due to lack of data allowing for analysis of both the individual and contextual 
levels at the same time, this investigation focuses only on contextual factors. Being purely contextual, 
it does not attempt to make inferences about the voters’ political choices based on their belonging to a 
group. 1 It aims only to demonstrate that some environments feature a higher level of support for the 
extreme-right than others. 
2  Theory 
There are two competing contextual-level explanations for the relationship between immigrants and 
extreme-right support. Realistic Conflict Theory, developed by Donald Campbell (1965), seeks to 
understand the tensions between groups competing for power and resources in a society. When one 
group has access to limited resources, the arrival of an out-group will increase demand for those 
resources, threatening the in-group that originally had access. An increase in the size of the out-group 
leads to greater awareness of a foreign presence in the community which exacerbates competition 
between natives and immigrants. Hostility to immigrants is expressed by casting a vote for the extreme-
right. The question then turns to the resources that are being fought over. Some studies have focused on 
basic needs such as employment, education and housing, but competition can also be centred on less 
tangible resources such as culture and identity. The issue of the 2004 ban on headscarves in public 
schools is an example of competition over culture and identity in France. Many natives view the 
headscarf as a symbol of outsiders amongst them, fearing a loss of identity as the population grows. 
Whether the resources being fought over are materialistic or cultural, the outcome is the same. Thus 
according to Realistic Conflict Theory, the presence of a significant out-group threatens the in-group’s 
resource pool, encouraging them to vote for the extreme-right (Walchuk, 2011).  
An alternative contextual explanation for the relationship between immigrants and extreme-
right support is Gordon Allport’s Contact Theory (1954), which posits that the size of the out-group 
actually has a negative relationship with the level of support for the extreme-right. This is because it is 
easier to vilify immigrants when one has little contact with them. As an unknown spectre immigrants 
can take on whatever characteristics they are attributed, but once a voter comes into contact with a 
foreigner they are able to make the judgment for themselves and this judgement rarely coincides with 
the portrayal put forth by the extreme-right (Walchuk, 2011). Williams (1947) points out that most 
actions undertaken to resolve intergroup conflict rest upon the assumption that increased contact results 
in personal connections which overcome the competition impulse. McLaren (2003) found evidence to 
support this theory in the case of European immigration. In her research those who had multiple 
immigrant friends perceived the immigrant community to be less of threat than those who had no contact 
with foreigners. Early research on the contact hypothesis suggested that it only applied under certain 
conditions such as equal status, common goals and support for contact from authority (Allport, 1954), 
but more recent research has shown that contact can also lead to personal connections outside stringent 
settings. Using Muslims in Germany as a case study, Pettigrew et al. (1998) found that even relatively 
coincidental contact could result in improved relations between the in-group and the out-group. Thus 
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according to Contact Theory, greater contact with the out-group diminishes competition, resulting in 
less support for the extreme-right.  
Previous contextual analyses of the relationship between immigrants and extreme-right support 
in France have yielded mixed results. Using individual towns and neighbourhoods as their unit of 
analysis, Perrineau in Grenoble (1989), Rey and Roy in Seine-Saint-Denis (1986) and Mayer in Paris 
(1987) found a negative relationship between the share of immigrants and the level of support for the 
Front National. Instead of focusing on individual towns, Lubber and Scheepers’ (2002) aggregated their 
data at the level of the department discovering a positive relationship between the share of immigrants 
and level of support for the Front National. The fact that studies focusing on a smaller unit of analysis 
found a negative relationship whereas those focusing on a larger unit of analysis found a positive 
relationship suggests that Contact Theory and Realistic Conflict Theory operate at different levels of 
aggregation,  however  in  the  literature  a  comparison  of  the  relationship  between  immigrants  and 
extreme-right support at both levels is lacking. Contact Theory is based on personal connections 
established through immediate contact and interaction, therefore operating at a much lower level of 
aggregation. Realistic Conflict Theory on the other hand does not require immediate contact with 
immigrants and can be transmitted through other channels such as the media. Because the media 
projects images of ‘foreign invasions’ and high unemployment across the country, natives do not need 
to interact with immigrants on a day-to-day basis in order to perceive them as a source of competition. 
In an interview of the inhabitants of Abbeville in the department of the Somme, the French newspaper 
Libération emphasized the irrelevance of physical contact with foreigners for ethnic competition. ‘In 
this town there is no immigration, no one who comes to eat the bread or benefits of the French, and no 
one who prays to Allah in the streets’, said reporter Pascale Nivelle, ‘but one of the inhabitants’ main 
concerns is immigration, manifested by a 30% turnout for the Front National’ (Nivelle, Libération, 
2011). Although Abbeville has no experience of immigration, its inhabitants are heavily influenced by 
the debate on immigration in the media and the exposure of the Front National on television has made 
it more acceptable to vote for the extreme-right. ‘Little by little, the discourse of Marine Le Pen has 
become entrenched’, reported one of the inhabitants, ‘in Abbeville everyone is already convinced that 
foreigners should be kept out and no one is afraid of saying it out loud’ (Nivelle, Libération, 2011). As 
illustrated by the case of Abbeville, Realistic Conflict Theory does not require immediate contact with 
immigrants and therefore operates at a higher level of aggregation. 
The contradictory results found in the literature might also stem from the selection effects 
caused by residential choices. Xenophobic voters living in urban neighbourhoods where there are many 
immigrants  may  choose  to  move  out  to  semi-urban  and  rural  neighbourhoods  that  are  more 
homogenous. The exodus of natives to surrounding municipalities creates a halo of extreme-right 
support around the more diversely populated urban centre. From the perspective of the department, the 
relationship between immigrants and extreme-right support remains positive because although the 
xenophobic  voters  have  relocated  from  one  commune  to  the  next,  they  remain  within  the  same 
department. However from the perspective of the commune, the relationship becomes negative because 
the natives have relocated to surrounding municipalities where there are fewer immigrants. Perrineau 
(1989) has dubbed this phenomenon the ‘halo effect’. Selection effects are not only limited to the 
residential choices of natives, but also apply to the residential choices of immigrants. An immigrant’s 
decision as to where to settle is influenced by the presence of racial or cultural prejudices. It is unlikely 
that a foreigner would choose to settle in a neighbourhood with a high degree of anti-immigrant 
sentiment since it would be more difficult to find a job or housing (Halla et al., 2012). In conclusion, 
because of the selection effects caused by residential choices, and because Contact Theory operates at 
a smaller level of aggregation, we can expect to find a negative relationship between the share of IMI Working Papers Series 2013, No. 79    7 
immigrants and the electoral success of the Front National at the level of commune (H1). On the other 
hand, because Realistic Conflict Theory operates at a greater level of aggregation we can expect to find 
a positive relationship between the share of immigrants and the electoral success of the Front National 
at the level of the department (H2). 
Alongside immigration, unemployment is another contextual factor of extreme-right support. 
Jackman and Volpert (1996) examined the conditions that influenced the success of extreme-right 
parties  from  1970-1990.  Their  analyses  indicated  that  higher  rates  of  unemployment  provided  a 
favourable  environment  for  these  political  movements.  However,  Jackman  and  Volpert  treated 
unemployment and immigration as two separate factors, when in fact there is a strong link between the 
two. According to Realistic Conflict Theory, employment is one of the resources in-groups and out-
groups compete for. If jobs are scarce in a neighbourhood where there are many immigrants, then 
natives might come to the conclusion that immigrants are ‘stealing their jobs’. The connection between 
unemployment and immigration is often made by extreme-right parties in their electoral strategies. The 
Front National in France, the Republikaners in Germany and the Freedom Party in Austria have all 
been particularly vocal in linking the number of immigrants in their respective countries to the number 
of unemployed. For example, Jean-Marie Le Pen used the slogan ‘two million immigrants are the cause 
of two million French people out of work’ during the 1984 European elections in France (Mitra, 1988). 
These slogans seem to be explicit appeals to voters who fear that their material well-being is threatened 
by  the  influx  of  foreigners.  Although  there  is  little  empirical  evidence  to  support  the  claim  that 
immigration causes unemployment,2 the electoral success of extreme-right parties does not require that 
immigration actually causes unemployment, only that people believe that it does (Golder, 2003). 
Building on Jackman and Volpert’s work, Golder (2003) investigated the link between immigration and 
unemployment by adding an interaction term. He found that the effect of unemployment on extreme-
right parties is conditional on the level of immigration. Unemployment only increases the vote-share of 
these parties when there are large numbers of foreigners in the country. Based on the strong link between 
both factors highlighted by Golder, we can expect that the level of support for the Front National is 
greater when the presence of immigrants coincides with high unemployment (H3). 
3  A new geography of the Front National vote 
By focusing on contextual factors such as immigrants and unemployment, the literature on the Front 
National gives the impression that the party is an ‘urban phenomenon’ rooted in cities where both 
factors are intertwined, but there is indication that the vote is declining in urban strongholds and 
expanding to rural departments. In his analysis of the 1984 European elections, Perrineau (1989) was 
the  first  to  suggest  a  strong  correlation  between  urbanization,  the  proportion  of  immigrants  in  a 
community, and the success of the  Front National. Comparing the party to the former Poujadist 
movement which achieved its highest scores in France’s rural western provinces,3 he argued that the 
new extreme-right vote ‘expresses the hardships of living in an urban and modern society hard-struck 
by crisis’ (Mayer and Perrineau, 1989: 44). Perrineau concluded that the Front National was strongest 
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in large metropolitan centres with a significant immigrant population. Several years later, DeClair 
(1999) reaffirmed the party’s location in urban settings:  
‘Rural France and the long western coastline have not yet become enamoured 
by the party’s political rhetoric. Areas of high population density, suffering 
from  the  social  ills  of  economic  dislocation,  declining  industrial  capacity, 
unemployment and the insecurity that comes with the anomie of everyday urban 
life find solace in the Front’s parallel messages of anger and hope’ (DeClair, 
1999: 179).  
Contrary to the depiction of the Front National as an ‘urban phenomenon’ in the literature, recent 
headlines suggest that the vote is declining in urban strongholds despite a blossoming national average 
(TFI, 2012). In the big cities of southeast France the vote stagnated and the party remained in 2nd or 3rd 
place.  For  example  in  Nice,  which  has  a  large  community  of  Pied-Noirs  supporters  (repatriated 
Frenchmen who lived in Algeria before independence), the score fell from 29.12% (1995) to 23% 
(2002) and in Marseille Le Pen dropped from 2nd to 3rd place. In 2012 Marine Le Pen fared the worst in 
Paris: whereas in 1988 the Front National received below 10% in 18 departments, today Paris is the 
only department where the party claims less than 10%. In communes on the outskirts of Paris such as 
Clichy-sous-Bois, Grigny and Villiers-le-Bel, where the 2005 riots were started and where one would 
assume there is a strong relationship between immigrants and extreme-right support, the vote declined 
by 5-10% (Lamy, 2012).  
Anticipating a decline in urban strongholds, Ravenel et al. (2004) created a geographic model 
to test at what distance from a city the level of support was the strongest. They selected 42 cities with 
more than 200,000 inhabitants and constructed halos around them. Whereas in 1995 the highest scores 
were concentrated between 15-30 km away from the city centre, in 2002 they were between 30-50 km 
away and in 2004 they were 30-60 km away. Ravenel et al.’s experiment suggests that the Front 
National is moving further away from urban centres and beginning to take root in the countryside. 
During the 2012 presidential elections, Marine Le Pen gained many new supporters in rural areas 
previously untouched by the Front National, especially in the western part of the country. The vote 
skyrocketed in departments such as l’Orne, la Loire-Atlantique, les Côtes d’Armor, l’Ard￨che, la Haute-
Garonne, la Nièvre, la Saône et Loire, le Limousin and la Dordogne. La Dordogne is particularly 
illustrative of the growing presence of Le Pen in the countryside: whereas in the 2008 municipal 
elections the towns in this area awarded the Front National with less than 10% of the vote, today the 
party receives more than 25%. La Dordogne, like many of the other rural departments which have 
recently joined the party’s ranks is not only one of the safest places in France but also has a very small 
number of foreigners – around 17,000 of which 6,400 are British followed by Portuguese (Lamy, 2012). 
Based on this mutation of the geography of the vote, I expect that the level of support for Front National 
is higher in rural communes than in urban communes (H4). 
  In the second part of my analysis, I will investigate the new geography of the Front National 
vote by suggesting that it is a result of: 1) The agricultural crisis; 2) the growing divide between rural 
and urban spaces; and 3) the cut-backs on public services. Drawing from Social Disintegration Theory, 
I will argue that these three factors have contributed to a widespread feeling of exclusion from national 
progress and development in rural areas, creating a more favourable environment for the extreme-right 
vote.  In  doing  so,  I  hope  to challenge  the  existing  literature’s  narrow focus on  immigration  and 
unemployment as contextual factors for the vote. Some of the earlier work on Social Disintegration was 
carried out by Arendt (1951) and Bendix (1952). The main assumption of this tradition was that fascism 
exists and will continue to be successful in societies with little or declining integration. Modernization, 
industrialisation and urbanization lead to the destruction of social bonds and disengagement with social IMI Working Papers Series 2013, No. 79    9 
institutions. This process, referred to by Kornhauser (1950) as ‘social atomisation’, can also result from 
an economic crisis. During a crisis there is a declining interest in politics because people become 
disappointed with existing political parties. ‘Socially disintegrated people’ are defined as those who are 
totally  isolated  from  any  traditional  social  support  system  (Falter,  1991).  Arendt  and  Bendix 
investigated the connections between disintegration and voting for the National Socialist German 
Workers’ Party in the 1930s and found that the electorate was not typified by any social characteristics 
but consisted solely of disintegrated individuals out of all strata of society. Similarly, Falter and Klein 
(1994) found that victims of fast changes are not limited to one socio-economic category but can be 
found among all classes and groups in society. One reason why disintegrated individuals vote for the 
extreme-right, is that their longing for ‘good old times’ coincides with the party’s appeal to nostalgia. 
Another reason is the notion of ‘substitute forms of integration’ (Werts, 2010). Social Identification 
Theory tells us that people search for a positive self-identity. Individuals without social participation 
and social contacts cannot develop a positive attitude toward themselves because they do not receive 
confirmation from other people. They are forced to find alternative solutions in order to get rid of their 
negative self-image and obtain a positive self-identity. This search for a positive self-image makes 
people vulnerable to manipulation through, among others, symbols and leaders, both of which are 
typical features of extreme-right parties (Kornhauser, 1960).  
The first factor contributing to the social disintegration of rural communes is the agricultural 
crisis. Over the past 30 years the number of individual farms was halved and the average size of these 
farms was reduced from 190 to 100 acres. In 2007 the agricultural sector of the economy employed 
only 6.2% of the working population compared to 12% in 1980. The 2008 financial crisis dealt a 
massive blow to farmers by increasing the costs of production resulting in a 34% loss of land in 2009 
(France Info, 2010). ‘Because of the crisis we are losing many jobs in rural areas’, said Yves Krattinger, 
representative for rural areas in Francois Hollande’s campaign, ‘parents are worried that their children 
will not find jobs. They do not have a positive vision of society and politics and they think the rural 
world is not taken into consideration’ (Bekmezian, Le Monde, 2012). The government set out to tackle 
the crisis by reforming traditional agricultural modes of production known as the Politique Agricole 
Commune (PAC), but the regulations were psychologically and ideologically disorientating for many 
farmers (Ravenel et al., 2004). In Crotoy, a port-town in the department of La Somme, Marine Le Pen 
was the inhabitants’ first choice. ‘The fishermen and hunters of Crotoy are fed up with the regulations 
on fishing, hunting and the environment so they voted for the Front National’, said Mayor Jean-Louis 
Wadoux (Grandmaison, Le Monde, 2012). Based on individual-level surveys by IFOP and CEVIPOF, 
the extreme-right vote has more than doubled among farmers, rising from 13% in 1995 to 25% in 2002 
(Ravenel et al., 2004). In 2002 Le Pen achieved a 22% score among hunters and fishermen, compared 
to 10% in 1988. During the 2007 presidential elections, 40.60% of farmers agreed with Le Pen’s ideas 
as opposed to 29.6% for all other socio-professional categories (Lamy, 2012). As a result of the 
disintegration caused by the agricultural crisis, I expect to find a positive relationship between the share 
of people working in the agriculture, hunting, and fishing sector of the economy and the level of support 
for the Front National (H5). 
The second factor contributing to the social disintegration of rural communes is the growing 
divide between rural and urban spaces. The concept of a new geography of social cleavages which 
opposes the city to the rural outskirts is gaining force in France (Ravenel et al., 2004). ‘There is a 
dialogue behind the rural-urban divide which pits the losers of globalisation against the winners’, 
explains geographer Christophe Guilluy, ‘Marine Le Pen has seized on this dialogue and speaks to the 
little villages and zones of de-industrialisation that have been abandoned’ (Mestre, 2012: par 7). The 
physical separation between rural and urban spaces is emphasized by the distance which people have 10     IMI Working Papers Series 2013, No. 79 
to travel in order to find work. Urbanisation and the cost of living in cities have increased at an alarming 
rate over the past decade driving former urbanites into the countryside where the cost of living is more 
affordable. ‘The rural underclass is not just agricultural’, says Sylvain Crepon, a sociologist who 
specialises in the French far right, ‘there are also commuters who have fled the big cities and inner 
suburbs because they can no longer afford to live there. Many of these people will have recently 
experienced  living  in  the  banlieues  (high-immigration  suburbs)  and  have  witnessed  problems  of 
insecurity’ (Schofield, 2012: par. 17). An influx of commuters can be destabilizing for the internal 
structures and cohesion of rural communes. For example, if they do not seek to integrate into their new 
surroundings they could create tensions with the local population. Bearing in mind that commuters may 
perceive their removal to the outskirts of the city as a form of ‘exclusion from society’, they could also 
contribute to the widespread feeling of exclusion in rural communes. Therefore, I expect to find a 
positive relationship between the share of commuters and the level of support for the Front National 
(H6).  
The rural-urban dialogue reinforces the dynamic of Perrineau’s halo effect discussed above. 
Perrineau suggests that xenophobic voters leave the city in order to live in surrounding areas where 
there are fewer immigrants. In a similar fashion, former urbanites are forced to leave the city and settle 
on the outskirts where life is more affordable. In a sense, the removal of former urbanites to the outskirts 
complements the residential choices of xenophobic voters. Although their reasons for supporting the 
Front National may be different, they are both situated in communes surrounding the city. It is not just 
in isolated fields and pastures hard-struck by the agricultural crisis that people see the appeal of the 
extreme-right, but also in provincial towns and housing-estate commuter belts being built on the 
outskirts of the city. Therefore, I expect the level of support for the Front National to be higher in 
communes situated at the periphery of a city than those situated in the centre (H7). 
Finally, the social disintegration of rural communes is also a feature of the cut-backs on public 
services. In an attempt to counter the double onslaught of the agricultural crisis and the 2008 financial 
crisis,  the  government  introduced  the  Révision  Générale  des  Politiques  Publiques  (RGPP),  a 
programmeme aimed at reducing expenditures in rural communes by cutting back on public services. 
The RGPP has three main objectives: making sure administrations are better adapted to people’s needs; 
valorising the work of civil servants; and reducing public services by simplifying the functions of the 
state, for example by combining the gendarmerie and national police. ‘Rural territories have lost a lot 
as a result of the RGPP’, continued Krattinger, ‘and people in these territories feel excluded from the 
progress  and  development  of  public  services,  which  are  slowly  receding  from  the  countryside’ 
(Bekmezian, Le Monde, 2012). People in rural communes feel the hopelessness of a life in poverty 
uncompensated for by the traditions and structures that would have made it bearable in the past. Shops 
are now in vast out-of-town zones; no one goes to church; work is a 50km drive away; and the cost of 
the two staples, cigarettes and petrol, has shot through the roof (Schofield, BBC, 2012). The Front 
National has seized on this lack of infrastructure and is speaking out against the RGPP. In Bailleul, 
another commune which featured a strong turn-out rate for Marine Le Pen, co-Mayor Stéphane Courtois 
complained,  ‘here  the  school  was  closed  6  years  ago.  Then  there  was  the  suppression  of  the 
gendarmerie. We have lost our liberty because of all these cut-backs’ (Grandmaison, Le Monde, 2012). 
Due to the social disintegration caused by the cut-backs of the RGPP, I expect to find a negative 
relationship between the availability of public services and the level of support for the Front National 
(H8). 
 IMI Working Papers Series 2013, No. 79    11 
 
4  Data and methods 
Whereas previous contextual analyses of the relationship between immigrants and the success of the 
Front National are situated EITHER at the level of the town OR at the level of the department, I will 
compare the relationship at both levels. For my higher level I propose the ‘d￩partment’ which is larger 
than the commune but smaller than the region. In France there are 96 departments of which 5 are 
overseas. Since the relationship between immigration and extreme-right support is probably different 
overseas, these 5 departments were dropped resulting in a sample of 91. For my lower level I propose 
the ‘commune’ which is the fifth and smallest administrative division in France. Communes are roughly 
equivalent to townships or incorporated municipalities in the United States. A commune may be a city 
of two million inhabitants like Paris, a town of 10,000 people, or a ten-person hamlet. In the three 
biggest cities (Paris, Lyon and Marseilles) the lowest administrative division is not the commune but 
the  municipal  ‘arrondissement’.  Ideally  the  arrondissements  should  be  treated  as  individual 
observations, but unfortunately the election results do not provide the percentage of votes for each 
arrondissment, treating the entire city as a single unit instead. The total sample size for communes was 
36,200.  
The data for the results of 2012 presidential elections (1st round) was obtained from the Ministry 
of Interior’s website (data.gov.fr, 2013). Seeing as this data was published in early 2013, it has not yet 
been used in an analysis of the extreme-right vote in France. The results provide the percentage of votes 
cast  for  Marine  Le  Pen  by  commune,  which  I  used  as  my  dependent  variable  throughout  the 
investigation. The data on the immigration status and employment activity of the inhabitants of each 
commune was obtained from the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies’ most recent 
population census (INSEE, 2009). Since 2004, INSEE produces an annual population census by means 
of a rolling collection method. In this rolling collection, every commune is surveyed once within a five 
year period which means that the numbers remain fairly constant throughout the years. Both the election 
results and population census were collected at the level of the commune and each commune has an 
individual code, making it possible to merge both datasets with Stata.  
The  first  two  independent  variables  created  were  the  share  of  immigrants  (number  of 
immigrants ÷ total population)4 and the rate of unemployment (number of unemployed inhabitants ÷ 
total active population 15 years or older).5 In order to test H3 (the level of support for the Front National 
is greater when the presence of immigrants coincides with high unemployment) an interaction variable 
was created by multiplying the share of immigrants with the rate of unemployment. Because the size of 
the population might have an effect on the level of support for the Front National, a variable controlling 
for total population per commune was included.6 All of the independent variables were then reproduced 
at the departmental level by aggregating the total number of immigrants and the total number of 
                                                       
4 INSEE defines an ‘immigrant’ as someone who was born abroad but resides in France which means that the second and third 
generations do not count as immigrants. Seeing as the majority of issues related to immigration revolve around ‘integration’, 
it would be beneficial to have data on the second and third generations, but unfortunately information on race, ethnicity and 
country of origin are hard to come by in France due to Republican values.  
5 In order to make the coefficients easier to interpret, all rates were converted into percentages (from 0 to 100 instead of 0  to 
1), which is also the scale of measurement for the dependent variable. 
6 The variable for population was standardized around the mean since a value of ‘0’ makes no sense.  12     IMI Working Papers Series 2013, No. 79 
unemployed across all communes in a department and subsequently dividing by the total population of 
that department. 
 
Table 1: Description of variables 
Variables  SD  Mean 
Dependent     
% of votes for Front National  7.12%  21.35% 
independent (commune)     
share of immigrants  4%  4% 
rate of unemployment  4%  9% 
total population  14717.9  1716.7 
share of farmers  31.7  20.74 
share of commuters  16%  26% 
independent (department)     
share of immigrants  3%  6% 
rate of unemployment  2%  11% 
total population  461827  658452 
 
The data from INSEE was also used to investigate whether there is a link between the Front 
National and the social disintegration of rural communes. For this I added variables on a) the type of 
commune – rural/urban; b) share of farmers; c) the share of commuters; d) the location of the commune 
relative to a city; and e) public services. For the first variable I incorporated INSEE’s definition of an 
‘urban’ commune as having a population of more than 2,000 people and belonging to a continuous 
construction zone where there is a maximum of 200 meters between every building. A ‘rural’ commune 
on the other hand does not belong to a continuous construction zone and has a population of 2,000 or 
less. In order to tie the spread of the Front National to the agricultural crisis the share of farmers was 
generated by dividing the number of people working in the agriculture, hunting and fishing sector of 
the economy by the total working population over 15 years old. The share of commuters was created 
by dividing the number of people who travel to a workplace outside their commune by the total working 
population over 15 years. Location was measured based on whether the commune belongs to a city 
centre, is situated at the periphery or is isolated. INSEE has singled out three types of cities: big cities 
(10,000  jobs  or  more),  medium  cities  (5,000  –  10,000  jobs)  and  small  cities  (1,500-5,000).  For 
practicality, I combined the medium and small cities into one category and their peripheries into one 
category as well. In the end there were 5 categories measuring location: ‘big city centre’, ‘periphery of 
big city’, ‘small and medium city centre’, ‘periphery of small and medium city’ and ‘isolated’ (see 
figure 1). Finally, the data on public services was obtained from a more recent survey carried out by 
INSEE in 2011. Public services in France are ‘infracommunal’ which means that instead of being rooted 
in one commune, they are available to several communes. The infracommunal distribution of services 
produces a much smaller subsample of communes (1,796 as opposed to the usual 36,200). Eight dummy 
variables representing important day-to-day facilities typically provided by the state were generated: 
‘job centre’, ‘treasury’, ‘banks’, ‘legal services’, ‘security’, ‘funeral homes’, ‘post offices’ and ‘garages IMI Working Papers Series 2013, No. 79    13 
for  automobiles  and agricultural  equipment’.7  ‘Banks’  also  includes  ATMs.  ‘Legal  services’ is a 
combination of labour courts, commercial courts, courts of appeal and district courts which often do 
not have direct equivalents in the United States or the United Kingdom. ‘Security’ is both the police 
and gendarmerie (see table 2 for distribution of public services). 
In order to compare the relationship between immigrants and support for the Front National in 
communes to the relationship in departments, both levels were integrated into a multilevel model using 
Stata. Multilevel modelling is the most useful method for investigating geographic variations where a 
smaller unit is nested within a larger one. A normal regression does not take into account the clustering 
of data at both levels, giving the appearance of reduced variation. By inserting the variables into a 
multilevel model (command ‘xtmixed’ in Stata) it is possible to control for the fact that communes are 
nested in departments, respecting the hierarchy of clustering.  
Figure 1: Location of communes 
 
 
Table 2: Distribution of public services per commune 
stats  jobcentre  funeral 
homes 
banks/ 
ATM  garages  treasury  post 
office  security  legal 
services 
mean  0.05  2.48  11.73  17.65  0.95  2.06  0.86  0.43 
sd  0.43  3.04  19.83  22.33  1.53  2.65  0.92  1.14 
min  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
max  20  51  259  424  15  35  14  5 
                                                       
7 Unfortunately, some of the public services typically provided by the state, most notably education, did not feature in the 
survey by INSEE.  
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5  Results 
Using the technique of multilevel modelling, seven different models were run. Throughout the entire 
investigation, the total population of communes and departments was controlled for and in the analysis 
on social disintegration the share of immigrants and the rate of unemployment were also controlled for. 
Model 1 tested the relationship between the share of immigrants and the level of support for the Front 
National  at  the  communal  level  only.  The  results  reveal  a  negative  relationship;  as  the  share  of 
immigrants in communes increases, the level of support for the Front National decreases. Population 
also has a negative effect on the vote. In a multilevel model we can calculate the Intraclass Correlation 
(ICC), or the unexplained share of variance situated at the higher level – which in this case is the 
department – by dividing the variance at the departmental level by the sum of the variances at the 
departmental and communal levels. The ICC in Model 1 is 0.43 (43%) suggesting that department 
variables play an important role in determining the level of support for Le Pen in communes.  
In Model 2, the departmental variable was introduced. Whereas the relationship between the 
share of immigrants and the percentage of votes for the Front National is negative in communes, the 
relationship is positive in departments, confirming both H1 and H2. Although the total population of 
communes continues to have a negative effect on the vote, the population term for departments is 
insignificant. When the departmental variables are introduced, the ICC remains the same which means 
that there are other factors besides immigrants which can help to explain the level of support for the 
Front National at the departmental level.  
It is possible that unemployment has more force in explaining the vote than the share of 
immigrants therefore Model 3 tested the rates of unemployment in both communes and departments. 
Generally, there is a positive relationship between unemployment and the percentage of votes. As 
unemployment goes up, so does support for the extreme-right. When unemployment is introduced the 
direction of the relationship between the share of immigrants and support for the Front National at the 
communal and departmental level remains the same but the relationship in departments becomes 
insignificant. In this Model, the ICC drops from 43% to 39.6% which suggests that unemployment has 
more force in explaining cross-department variation in extreme-right voting. 
In order to test H3 (the level of support for the Front National is greater when the presence of 
immigrants  coincides  with  high  unemployment),  Model  4  was  run  with  the  interaction  variable. 
Contrary to H3, the interaction of both factors  decreases support for the  Front National in both 
communes and departments. In communes the negative effect of immigrants is even stronger when 
there is high unemployment. In departments on the other hand, the positive effect of immigrants 
suddenly becomes negative when there is high unemployment, suggesting that the effect of immigrants 
on the vote is attenuated by the presence of unemployment.8 In conclusion, whereas the presence of 
unemployment by itself leads to more support for Le Pen, the presence of both factors has the opposite 
effect (for results to models 1-4 see table 3). 
 The final three models focused on the relationship between the Front National and the social 
disintegration  of  rural  communes.  Because  of  collinearity  the  variables  representing  the  type  of 
                                                       
8 This might be due to compositional effects whereby a large proportion of unemployed voters are also immigrants 
in which case the interaction term leads to fewer votes for Le Pen because immigrants are unlikely to vote for the 
extreme-right. Compositional effects will be discussed later on.  IMI Working Papers Series 2013, No. 79    15 
commune (rural/urban) and the location (centre, periphery and isolated) could not be placed in the same 
command therefore Model 5 was run using the former with ‘urban’ as a reference category and Model 
6 was run using the latter with ‘big city centre’ as a reference category. Both 5 and 6 also included the 
variables on share of farmers and share of commuters. Based on Model 5, the level of support for the 
Front National is 1.68 percentage points higher in rural communes than in urban communes, which 
validates H4. As expected, there is a significant and positive relationship between the share of farmers 
and the percentage of votes for the Front National. However, contrary to expectation, an increase in the 
share of commuters leads to a decrease in support. When the variables representing the type of commune 
are replaced with the variables representing location, the direction of the coefficients for share of 
farmers and share of commuters remain the same. The communes with the least votes for Le Pen are 
those in ‘big city centres’ followed by those in ‘small and medium city centres’. The communes with 
the most votes are those which are ‘isolated’ or situated at the ‘periphery of a big city’. These findings 
support the claim that the level of support for the Front National is higher in communes situated at the 
periphery of a city than those situated in the centre.  
Finally, because the survey on public services was carried out on a much smaller subsample, 
Model 7 focused only on public services. Four out of eight services have a negative effect on the level 
of support for the Front National. Whereas the availability of job centres, banks, legal services and 
security decreases the percentage of votes for Le Pen, the availability of post offices, funeral homes, 
garages and a treasury increases the percentage of votes for Le Pen, providing only partial support for 
H8 (for results to models 5-7 see table 4).  
Table 3: Analysis 1 (immigration and extreme-right support) 
Variables   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Dependent             
% of votes             
Independent             
share of immigrants (com)   -0.15***   -0.15***  -0.19***  -0.06 *** 
share of immigrants (dep)      .12*  0.05   1.24** 
Control variables         
rate of unemployment (com)        .16***  .22*** 
rate of unemployment (dep)        .88***  1.65*** 
immigrants x unemployment (com)           -.01 *** 
immigrants x uenmployment (dep)           -.10** 
total population std. (com)  -0.31***  -0.33***  -0.35***  -0.33*** 
total population std. (dep)     0.44  0.18  -0.14 
Constant  21.4***  19.77***  10.21 ***  0.42 
random effects parameters              
sd (_cons)  4.29  4.3  3.8  3.54 
sd (_residual)  5.82  5.83  5.79  5.78 
N  36,200  36,200  36,200  36,200 
* p <.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001              
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Table 4: Analysis 2 (Front National and social disintegration of rural communes) 
Variables   Model 5  Model 6  Model 7 
Dependent          
% of votes          
Independent          
share of farmers   .01***  .01***    
rural   1.44***       
urban   Ref       
share of commuters  -.05***  -.05***    
big city centre     Ref   -3.60* 
periphery of big city     2.34***  -1.72 
medium & small city centre     1.62***   -3.60* 
periphery of medium & small city     2.24***  Omitted 
Isolated     2.38***  Ref 
job centre        -.29** 
Treasury        0.14 
Banks        -0.04** 
legal services        -0.69*** 
Security        -0.12 
funeral homes        0.03 
post office        0.06 
garages         .03***  
control variables          
share of immigrants (com)  -.14***  -.13***  -.24*** 
share of immigrants (dep)  0.00  0.01  .21* 
rate of unemployment (com)  .20***  .2***  .49*** 
rate of unemployment (dep)  .88***  .89***   .87*** 
total population std. (com)  -.20***  -.15***  -0.16 
total population std. (dep)  0.08  0.03  -0.35 
Constant  9.96***  8.89***  6.65** 
random effects parameters           
sd (_cons)  3.56  3.49  3.05 
sd (_residual)  5.7  5.7  3.33 
N  36,150  36,150  1,795 
* p <.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001           
 
6  Discussion 
Based on the results we cannot give precedence to either Realistic Conflict Theory or Contact Theory, 
instead what we see is a combination of both working at different administrative levels. At the level of 
the commune there is a negative relationship which suggests that Contact Theory is at work. At the 
level of the department the relationship is positive which suggests that Realistic Conflict Theory is at IMI Working Papers Series 2013, No. 79    17 
work. Whereas Contact Theory is dependent on immediate proximity, Realistic Conflict Theory is not: 
living in a department with a significant immigrant population is enough reason to vote for the Front 
National. One explanation for this might be the effect of the regional media which spreads images of 
high immigration, unemployment, and insecurity to other towns within the same department. Another 
reason might be Perrineau’s halo effect which posits that xenophobic natives living in high immigrant 
areas will move to surrounding municipalities where there are fewer immigrants, creating a network of 
homogenous communes within a department with a relatively diverse population. The results enable us 
to compare communes based on their share of immigrants, but they cannot tell us whether these 
communes are located within departments with many immigrants or within departments with few 
immigrants.  
By dividing the share of immigrants into quartiles where the first quartile represents communes 
and departments with the smallest share and the fourth quartile represents those with the biggest share 
and subsequently running an interaction in Stata, we can compare different communes within different 
departments. For example, do communes with the lowest share of immigrants score higher when they 
are located in departments with the lowest share of immigrants or in departments with the highest share 
of immigrants? The interaction of the categorical variables at both levels revealed that communes with 
low levels of immigration are more likely to vote for the Front National if situated in departments with 
high levels of immigration (see table in appendix). This finding in is line with Perrineau’s halo effect 
because it suggests that the dynamics which contribute to a higher percentage of votes at both the 
communal and departmental level are not independent of each other, but reinforce each other. The 
positive relationship between immigrants and support for the Front National in departments does not 
contradict the negative relationship in communes, instead it is a combination of both which leads to the 
highest score for Marine Le Pen. This explains why the highest scores for Le Pen come from communes 
with very few immigrants situated in departments with many immigrants. In a recently published article, 
Daniel J. Della Posta performed a similar multilevel analysis comparing communes and departments, 
but focusing on the 2007 presidential elections. Della Posta found similar results: the relationship was 
negative in communes and positive in departments. Instead of studying all 36,200 communes, he chose 
a random sample of 1,450 communes and ensured that each department was represented by at least two 
communes. The most heavily represented department (Pas-de-Calais) featured 46 communes while the 
average number of sampled communes per department was 15.59. Despite selecting a much smaller 
sample and despite using elections that took place before the 2008 financial crisis, Della Posta’s findings 
match the results of this investigation which suggests that the relationship between immigrants and 
support for the Front National is quite robust.  
Compositional effects may provide an alternative explanation to the negative relationship 
between immigrants and support for the Front National in communes. If immigrants are allowed to vote 
in the presidential elections, then it is no surprise that the level of support for Le Pen is lowest in 
communes with many immigrants; as immigrants are unlikely to vote for the extreme-right. In order to 
establish whether there are any compositional effects at play, we need to know whether foreigners are 
allowed to vote. INSEE defines an immigrant as anyone who was born abroad, regardless of whether 
they have acquired citizenship which means that a substantial number of immigrants may be allowed 
to vote. Based on INSEE’s population census, there are 43.2 million voters in France of which 8% are 
born abroad. Half of these 8% are French by birth and the other half have been nationalised. Of the 4% 
that have been nationalised, only 25% are registered to vote which means that there are 432,000 
immigrants registered to vote in France. When compared to a total population of 3.7 million immigrants, 
this is quite small: only 11% of foreigners vote in the presidential elections (Niel and Lincot, 2012). 
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voting. Therefore the compositional effects might be very small but in order to be conclusive, further 
investigation into the candidate choices and turnout rates of immigrants is necessary.  
Unsurprisingly, there is a positive relationship between unemployment and support for the 
Front National at both administrative levels. However, when unemployment is interacted with the share 
of immigrants in Model 4, the relationship at the level of the department becomes negative. This is 
puzzling given the strong link between unemployment and immigrants created by the Front National 
and given the findings of Golder’s (2003) article. In her contextual analysis of the relationship between 
foreigners and the extreme-right in France, Shvets (2004) also finds that while the share of immigrants 
at the departmental level bears a positive sign, the interaction term bears a negative sign. When 
unemployment is high people vote for Le Pen regardless of foreigners and when the share of immigrants 
is high people vote for Le Pen regardless of unemployment but when both factors are high together, the 
vote suddenly decreases. Why is it that when both factors are present in a department, the level of 
support for the Front National decreases? On one hand it might be that the relationship between both 
factors is spurious: voters do not see immigrants as a source of unemployment and unemployment is 
not the main reason they dislike immigrants.  
Realistic Conflict Theory tells us that in-groups and out-groups are in competition for resources 
but these resources need not be materialistic; they can also be related to culture and identity. In-groups 
may perceive migrants as a threat to their culture and identity which is why they vote for the Front 
National regardless the level of unemployment in their department. On the other hand we need to 
question whether the natives really see immigrants as a source of competition for jobs. Articles by 
Borjas (1994) and Altonji & Card (1991) on the economic impact of immigration suggest that because 
the majority of immigrants are low-skilled, only low-skilled natives perceive them as a source of 
competition in the labour market. In their investigation of the relationship between immigrants and the 
electoral success of the Austria’s Freedom Party, Halla et al. (2012) divide immigrants into low, 
medium, and high-skilled categories. Whereas proximity to low-skilled foreigners encouraged Austrian 
voters to turn to the far right, proximity to high-skilled voters either had an insignificant or negative 
effect on the vote. Further contextual analysis could investigate whether the direction of the relationship 
between immigrants and the Front National is dependent on the skills of natives and foreigners. Finally, 
if a large proportion of immigrants are also unemployed, the negative effect of the interaction term 
might simply be a result of the compositional effects discussed above whereby immigrants are unlikely 
to vote against their own interests therefore an increase in foreigners leads to a decrease in support.  
It is clear from the results that the Front National is not an ‘urban phenomenon’ but a ‘rural 
phenomenon’: population has a negative effect on the vote, rural communes are more likely to vote for 
Marine Le Pen than urban communes, and communes that are isolated or situated outside a city are 
those where the percentage of votes is the highest. Whether this is solely a feature of the social 
disintegration caused by 1) the agricultural crisis; 2) the growing rural-urban divide; and 3) the cut-
backs on public services is uncertain. There is only partial evidence to support the social disintegration 
theory. The relationship between the share of farmers and support for the Front National is significant 
and positive which suggests that communes with more farmers are likely to vote for Le Pen. Contrary 
to the claim that commuters contribute to the widespread feeling of social exclusion in rural communes, 
the share of commuters actually had a negative effect on the vote. The underlying assumption was that 
commuters are people who cannot afford to live in the city when they might actually be wealthier 
citizens in search of ample space to raise a family. Four out of eight public services had a negative effect 
on the vote (banks, legal services, security and job centres) providing only partial support for H8. Some 
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Ideally, another variable measuring change in availability of services over time would provide a more 
effective measurement of the RGPP. 
Through the use of contextual factors we can prove that communes with a high share of farmers 
are more likely to vote for the Front National, but this does not necessarily mean that farmers are more 
likely to vote for the extreme-right than any other socio-professional category (or else we would be 
committing an ecological fallacy), nor can we be conclusive about the reasons why they voted. It is 
possible that farmers voted for Le Pen because of immigration as well. According to Contact Theory, 
those who do not have any contact with foreigners are more likely to see them as a threat therefore it is 
no surprise that farmers living in isolated, rural pastures feel strongly against immigration. In order to 
truly establish a link between the Front National and the agricultural crisis, the contextual factors need 
to be substantiated by individual-level data or by qualitative evidence. The comments and interviews 
on <france-ruralité.fr>, a website created by the Front National in 2013 as a forum for people concerned 
by the agricultural crisis, provide such evidence. The website’s homepage is covered with slogans such 
as: ‘Frenchmen do not forget your farmers and fishermen’, ‘proud to work and live in the countryside’, 
and ‘with Marine Le Pen we will restore our farms’ (france-ruralité.fr, homepage, 2013). In a filmed 
interview of several farmers from the department of Finist￨re in Brittany, one farmer complained, ‘we 
work 120 hours a week and make only 500 Euros a month, today we are fed up and no longer want to 
partake in a system where the number of suicides on farms is on average two a day’ (France-ruralité.fr, 
video, 2013). In response to a video of Marine Le Pen’s speech on the agricultural crisis in Chateauroux, 
one commentator wrote, ‘thank you for your speech. I live in a small village in Ardèche where life is 
not easy. The rural areas are abandoned and at the mercy of big cities [...] during the summer people 
from the cities invade our countryside and leave their waste behind. They destroy our fences and look 
down upon us in snobbery’ (Frontnational.com, video, 2012). By incorporating these comments into an 
investigation of the Front National’s spread to rural areas, we can be more conclusive about the reasons 
why people living in the countryside are voting for Marine Le Pen.  
The results on location provide strong evidence of a halo effect. Communes situated at the 
periphery of a city are more likely to vote for Le Pen than communes in the city centre. One reason for 
this might be the selection effects caused by residential choices. According to Perrineau’s halo effect, 
xenophobic voters move out to surrounding municipalities where there are fewer immigrants. Another 
possible reason is the increasing rate of urbanisation which pushes former urbanites out to more 
affordable neighbourhoods. In order to further investigate the city-periphery dynamic, information on 
the individual arrondissements of Paris, Lyon and Marseille is necessary. The differences in ethnic 
composition and wealth between the neighbourhoods of these three cities are vast, therefore treating the 
entire city as a single unit gives an impression of reduced variation. 
Finally, given the important role of the media in advertising the success of the Front National, 
a variable measuring exposure to media could be beneficial. Anti-immigrant rhetoric transmitted by the 
media  can  increase  hostility  to  foreigners  among  people  who  have  no  contact  with  them,  as 
demonstrated by the interviews of the inhabitants of Abbeville. Powerful headlines can exaggerate the 
importance of issues such as immigration by evoking images of an ‘immigrant invasion’. Television 
programmemes generate feelings of deprivation by transmitting images of wealthy neighbourhoods to 
people living in poorer areas. Surveys by the Conseil Sup￩rieur de l’Audiovisuel (CSA) demonstrate 
that people living in rural and semi-urban areas have greater exposure to the media than the rest of the 
population. In 2003, TF1 was the channel most French people trusted. 55% of people living in rural 
areas said they trusted TF1, compared to only 42% in urban areas. Similarly, 27% of people in rural 
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on these figures it seems that people in the countryside subscribe more to the media than people in urban 
areas suggesting that the media might be one of the factors contributing to the spread of the Front 
National in rural communes (Ravenel et al., 2004). 
7  Conclusion 
The findings of this investigation challenge the assumption that the relationship between immigration 
and extreme-right support is either a result of Realistic Conflict Theory or a result of Contact Theory. 
In the case of France, it seems to be a combination of both working at different levels of aggregation 
that leads to the greatest support for the Front National. There are also elements of a halo effect whereby 
the selection effects caused by the residential choices of immigrants and natives create a ring of 
extreme-right support around a city centre. In a second analysis, this investigation has expanded on the 
literature  about  the  Front  National  by  suggesting  that  there  are  contextual  factors  other  than 
immigration and unemployment which help to explain the vote. Using the 2012 presidential elections, 
I have shown that rural communes are more likely to vote for the extreme-right right than urban 
communes. The appeal of the Front National in rural communes was linked to: 1) the agricultural crisis; 
2) the rural-urban divide; and 3) the cut-backs on public services. While there is partial evidence to 
support these factors, in order to be more conclusive about the reasons why people in rural communes 
are voting for Le Pen, further investigation should incorporate individual-level data. Individual-level 
data can tell us about the socio-economic background of the voters and the issues that motivate them to 
vote for the extreme-right, thereby reducing the potential for ecological fallacy. Multilevel modelling 
is typically performed with two levels: the individual and the context. What I propose instead is a three-
tiered  model  integrating  the  individual, the  immediate context  (commune)  and  the  larger context 
(department). As this investigation has demonstrated the explanation for the vote lies not only between 
individuals and their immediate surroundings but also between individuals and their more distant 
surroundings. 
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Appendix 
Interaction Model (communes within departments) 
communes x departments  Coef. 
communes in 1st quartile   
x 1st quartile dep.  Ref 
x 2nd quartile dep.  2.24 
x 3rd quartile dep.  1.27 
x 4th quartile dep.  2.4* 
communes in 2nd quartile   
x 1st quartile dep.  -0.19 
x 2nd quartile dep.  -0.35 
x 3rd quartile dep.  0.01 
x 4th quartile dep.  0.76* 
communes in 3rd quartile   
x 1st quartile dep.  0.14 
x 2nd quartile dep.  -1.21*** 
x 3rd quartile dep.  -0.81** 
x 4th quartile dep.  -0.06 
communes in 4th quartile   
x 1st quartile dep.  -0.31 
x 2nd quartile dep.  -1.42*** 
x 3rd quartile dep.  -0.77* 
x 4th quartile dep.  -0.71* 
total population com.  -0.35*** 
total population dep.  0.4 
Constant  19.61*** 
* p <.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001   
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